ERNESTO SAGAS.
"An apparent contradiction?
popular perceptions Haitíy Dominican foreign policy. * Dr.
Ernesto Sagas
Latin American Studies Department and Puerto Ricans.
Lehman College, City University of New York
Paper presented at the Sixth Annual Conference of the Haitian Studies Association, Boston, MA. 14 to 15 October 1994.
Introduction:
foreign policy of the Republic Dominican rotates on two axes. The first is, like most countries in the region, obviously Washington DC The second is Port-au-Prince. The latter has less to do with commercial interests with safety issues. Haiti and the Dominican Republic are two nations trapped by historical circumstances in a small Caribbean island. A rare case indeed that causes the events occurring in one part of the island, have an eventual impact on the other side.
There is no escaping this reality, and this is why relations with Haiti, have always been more a matter of security than other cosa.La Dominican government's foreign policy towards Haiti is in apparent contradiction with their domestic policies toward Haitians living in the Dominican Republic. While Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic are subject to discrimination, frequent violations of their human rights and deportation, foreign relations with Haiti have not been confrontational, and sometimes even cordiales.También, while Haiti is popularly perceived in the Dominican Republic as chaotic, unstable, and an undemocratic country, the Dominican government has been indifferent to support democratic change in Haiti.
This paper will focus on both the long history on the current development of relations Haitian-Dominican, mainly regarding the tense relations between President Jean Bertrand Aristide and Joaquin Balaguer, and problems concerning the complimentación the Dominican government with the international embargo against Haiti.
I will also argue that the foreign policy of the Dominican Republic is guided by two axioms:
First, Haiti is perceived as a country where democracy does not fit, given the economic, political and human rights that there would to be addressed.
Second
a result of the first, the Dominican government sees the development of democracy in Haiti as a threat their national interests. It has therefore sought to preserve an authoritarian status in Haiti.
DECONFLICTO STORY AND COOPERATION:
Dominican historiographical tradition in the history of Haiti began when the buccaneers first sat foot on the northwestern Hispaniola (Peña Batlle 1946). Thereafter, the history of the island has been perceived as a long struggle in which the West tries to take the east, the French colonialists took it out on the colony of Santo Domingo and later tried to absorb Haiti Dominican Republic . This traditional view of the Haitian-Dominican relations was promoted by Rafael Trujillo's dictatorship over of his 31 years.
be emphasized more on the differences between Haitians and Dominicans on the common. A whole generation of Dominican leaders, and ordinary people alike, grew up under this ideology. As a result, today most Dominicans share these distorted historical myths. Perhaps that is why today there is little to celebrate in the history of the Haitian-Dominican relations.
to official recognition of the French colony of Saint-Domingue in 1777 by the Treaty of Aranjuez, the French and English in Hispaniola lived almost in a permanent war. The French constantly pushing their informal borders in their need ground, while the English carried out raids in a futile effort to eradicate the French presence in Hispaniola. Furthermore, the Hispaniola became a mirror of European politics: when France and Spain were at war in Europe, its colonial also fought in Hispaniola. In 1795 the French won the East, only to lose the entire island years later.
The Haitian revolution, liberating as it was, caused deep concern in the eastern side, where it was feared that violence would take over the whole island. In 1822, when Haiti resolved its internal problems, Jean Pierre Boyer annexed the former English colony of Santo Domingo. Boyer's motion was not opposed by the pro-Hispanic elites who had no army to fight, nor for the masses, Boyer laws perceived as egalitarian. In fact, Boyer abolished slavery and gave land to the lower class.
discontent scale really began when the economic conditions in Haiti deteriorated as a result of the burdensome weight of compensation to be paid to France, and because the land tenure system that became unprofitable small farms (Frank Moya Pons 1977 .)
On February 27, 1844 a group of Dominican conspirators advantage of the situation internal instability in Haiti declared independence. This independence was rather a peaceful event, but not consolidation. Haitian leaders considered the East not only as part of Haiti, but a vital area for security and economic welfare of the Haitian State. Thus, between 1844-1856 several Haitian leaders tried unsuccessfully to reanexar East. These protracted wars formed a anti-Haitian sentiment among the Dominican population stimulated by the dominant elites in order to reinforce nationalism. Shortly after the war led to Haitian-Dominican Dominican leaders to seek protection from foreign powers. His main concern was that the Dominican Republic had a population less than Haiti, as well as they thought it was not viable as an independent nation.
In 1861 the Haitian-Dominican relations entered a new dimension when Pedro Santana reanexó the Dominican Republic to Spain. The Dominican Republic is the only Latin American nation that reversed previous colonial status after independence, due to the reasons mentioned above. This turn of events profoundly worried Haitian leaders. The restoration of English power on Hispaniola could possibly have meant a return to slavery in the East. In addition, Spain had suggested he would try to regain their former territories in the central plateau of Haiti lost in the Haitian Revolution. The Haitian authorities gave refuge and logistics to Dominican revolutionaries who fought against the English, until Dominican independence was finally restored in 1865. Haitian leaders had determined, first, that Haiti and the Dominican Republic were two different nations, and second, that an independent Dominican Republic was preferable to having a European power on Hispaniola.
Now that looked sustainable peaceful coexistence, a problem remained, however: the demarcation of a fixed boundary between the two countries. The end of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth infructuasamente spent for these purposes. Political instability in both countries was difficult diplomatic negotiations, in addition, claims were still pending. The military occupation of Haiti by the United States (1915-1924) and the Dominican Republic (1916-1924) temporarily restricted new diplomatic initiatives between the two countries. However, U.S. military strategists noted that an undefined border war was a potential issue that could contribute to political instability in the strategic Caribbean region. As a result, was signed on January 21, 1929 settlement of the demarcation line between President Horacio Vasquez and Louis Borno (Jean Price-Mars 1953, 3:209-213).
In 1935 and 1936 Presidents Rafael L. Stenio Vincent Trujillo and additional clauses and amendments signed the Treaty of 1929, establishing, finally, a clearly demarcated border limit, which applies to hoy.Fue this the best time to have enjoyed the Haitian-Dominican relations. Even Trujillo visited Port-au-Prince and was warmly welcomed by the people. The Dominican press noted with praise, President Vincent and the Haitian people. It seemed like the nineteenth century they be fighting things of a forgotten past. However, Trujillo thought differently. With the definition of a boundary line, he sought to increase control over the Dominican Republic. For Trujillo the border did not represent the limit to his power but rather the beginning of your domain. As a result, Trujillo made the border issue one of its highest priorities of its foreign policy. The aftermath of the border treaty, however, infuriated Trujillo. He mistakenly thought that the treaty would mean a closed border. That was not the case.
The border treaty was a diplomatic settlement, and little had changed for the people living on both sides. For decades, after the cessation of wars Haitians, Dominicans, the border region where state authority was weak, leading to the development of a mixed population of "myrtle", Haitians, Dominicans speak English and cróele, partners in trade and smuggling across the border without being electors of a particular state (Michiel Baud 1993a, 1993b). An inspection tour of Trujillo along the border confirmed the weakness of the Dominican state in these dispersed populations (Carlos Cornielle 1980).
Trujillo's response was swift and brutal. In October 1937 he ordered the military to kill all Haitians in the Dominican Republic. Thousands of Haitians were killed in a few days, using machetes and clubs to give the impression that this had been the product of uncoordinated actions Dominican farmers who had decided to settle old scores. Estimates on the number of deaths were in the range from several hundred to 26,000, which were killed as far away as Santiago and Samaná (Bernardo Vega 1988, 386-387). Saved only those who worked on sugar plantations whose owners were American. The reasons behind the decisions of Trujillo to carry out the slaughter of 1937 were never clear (Bernardo Vega 1988, capt. 10). Back
the slaughter of 1937, Trujillo began a well publicized program of "Dominicanisation" of the border. Development programs were implemented and encouraged white immigrants to settle in the region. The aim of Trujillo was to create a socio-cultural barrier against Haitian influences to reinforce the military action of 1937. As part of this plan, the Dominican population was subjected to a constant barrage of anti-Haitian propaganda. Haiti and Haitians became good neighbors scapegoats for Dominican society. Stimulating a false nationalism Trujillo sought to distract public opinion by focusing on a foreign enemy. No purpose could be more convenient Haiti, given the long history of animosity between the two countries. That eventually became widespread propaganda in the ideology that is now known as antihaitianism. Two of its most prolific writers were Manuel Arturo Peña Batlle and Joaquin Balaguer (Ernesto Sagas 1993).
A whole generation of Dominicans grew under the influence of the tenets of the official apparatus antihaitianism while promoting the ideological line across the country. In addition, antihaitianism, with its twisted sense of history, allowed the poorest Dominicans feel racially and culturally superior to Haiti. The anti-Haitian ideology played a familiar chord in the Dominican psyche and Trujillo and their ideologues were very aware of it. In unresolved conflict with this virulent anti-Haitian rhetoric, Trujillo administration maintained cordial relationships with most of the Haitian rulers. The "incident" of 1937 was arranged through diplomatic channels and the Dominican Republic agreed to pay restitution of $ 750.000. In 1952 the two states signed an agreement to regulate the importation of Haitian workers for the industry azucarera.Este such agreements were renewed until 1986, when Jean-Claude Duvalier left Haiti. Needless to say that the trafficking of Haitian workers became into a lucrative business for political groups on both sides of the island. Trujillo also intervened constantly in Haitian political affairs. First, with the intention of preventing the exiled Dominicans of Haitian territory not take as a base and then, within the meaning of the Haitian political influence for their benefit. A good example was Elie Lescot. The race (politics / ndv) of Lescot was sponsored by Trujillo, who helped him ascend to the presidency of Haiti (Robert D. Crasssweller 1996). Trujillo
used bribery and intimidation to influence other Haitian political. The consolidation of the dictatorship of Francois Duvalier involved a new modus vivendi, by which these two strong men understood that it was of mutual benefit to protect each other, rather than fight each other. They had a common goal of survival and a common enemy, Fidel Castro's revolutionary Cuba.
HAITIAN-DOMINICAN RELATIONS AFTER TRUJILLO:
The preceding historical review has shown how the Haitian-Dominican relations have had their ups and downs. The period of the Haitian-Dominican wars in the nineteenth century led to suspicion and mutual mistrust. These differences were put aside when later in that century, Haitians helped the Dominican rebels fighting against Spain. Haitian-Dominican friendship reached highest degree of warmth when they were finally established the border between the two nations. Finally, the slaughter of Haitian migrants by troops of Trujillo in 1937 marked the beginning of popular animosity characterized by the development of the ideology of antihaitianism. So deep and lasting were the effects of propaganda Trujillo Haitians are still the main casualties of the Dominican society. At the diplomatic level, however, relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic were correct and even cordial. The balance of power had also been altered. While during the nineteenth century Haiti had been the most powerful nation on the island, by the time of the Trujillo Era these roles had been reversed. The Dominican Republic became the country interventionist who meddled in the affairs of its neighbors, in order to protect its national interest, just as he did in the nineteenth century Haiti. This reversal of values \u200b\u200bhad two main causes: the growth of the Dominican population, and development of the impressive fighting force that Trujillo gave the Dominican army.
The presidency of Juan Bosch, in 1963, resulted in one of the most tense periods in the contemporary Haitian-Dominican relations. Bosch, a liberal elected with wide popular support, saw Duvalier a tyrant like Trujillo. Bosch supported the efforts of Haitian exiles to oust Duvalier. In April 1963, a diplomatic incident in the Dominican embassy in Port-au-Prince led to the mobilization of Dominican troops to the border. In August and September the same year, Haitian exiles under the command of former general Cantave Leon attacked Haiti from bases in Dominican territory. At all times, the exiles were driven back into Dominican territory. These serious incidents caused an acute crisis, though short-lived, because soon after, Bosch was ousted by the Dominican military on September 25, 1963. His handling of the crisis in Haiti has been mentioned as one of the factors that tipped the Dominican military against Bosch (Diederich and Burt 1986, 220-221).
Joaquin Balaguer's election in 1966, and its exercise in power for 12 years, ushered in a new era in Haitian-Dominican relations. As mentioned before, Balaguer had been one of the main ideologists of antihaitianism, but he was also a pragmatic politician. The decades of the 60's and 70's were years of cordial relations supported by a leader who was well known for its anti-Haitian personal vision. During this period a new generation of liberal scholars who questioned, criticized and cast antihaitianism racist land. Mostly based on a Marxist conception of history, these intellectuals denounced antihaitianism as an ideological weapon of the Dominican ruling class (Roberto Cassá 1975). However, it was reflected the fact that antihaitianism was still a dominant ideology, and at least a vague mixture of such ideas were shared by much of the Dominican population.
Nineteen eighty-six was a momentous year in the island of Hispaniola. Duvalier, in power since 1957, were finally forced to leave Haiti. In the Dominican Republic, Balaguer was elected for a fourth term constitutional after been defeated in 1978 and 1982. Now, for the first time in decades, democracy appeared to flourish on both sides of the island. In 1986, Balaguer also confronted a completely renovated Haiti. After the fall of Duvalier, Haiti entered a period of political and social instability, therefore, different groups compete to fill the power vacuum left by the Duvalier. Balaguer's approach during this turbulent period diplomacy was cautious, fearing that the events occurring in Haiti could have unexpected consequences for the Dominican Republic. A severe civil unrest in Haiti could lead to an influx of refugees into the territory Dominican, a nightmare that the Dominican government was not prepared to handle. Thus, Balaguer maintained correct relations with the Haitian administration in power, and even granted asylum in the Dominican Republic to Haitian leaders overthrown.
ARISTIDE, BALAGUER, Y EL EMBARGO:
The election of Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1990 caused a public relations problem for the administration of Balaguer. Aristide inaugurated its mandate on February 7, 1991 (exactly five years after the fall of the Duvalier), is an outspoken advocate of lower classes. As a devout follower of liberation theology, Aristide and his movement Lavalas, was raised a profound transformation of Haitian society. He also openly denounced in international forums (such as UN) slave labor conditions of Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic. These allegations came just in the midst of a flurry of reports from human rights organizations (such as watchs Americas) U.S. news programs, and the International Labour Organization, in which the Dominican Republic was denounced for violating human rights. To make matters worse, the Council for Trade in the U.S. (U.S. Trade Representative) decided to review these allegations, before deciding to certify the Dominican Republic as eligible for the American system of preferences (James Ferguson 1992, 87-88). An adverse decision in this regard would mean, of course, an economic disaster for the Dominican Republic, as the GSP that guarantees preferential access for Dominican products in the U.S. market. Not surprisingly, Aristide became a figure non grata for the management of Balaguer, and for most of Dominican economic elites.
President Aristide became the target of perverts personal attacks in an effort to destroy his credibility. Even opposition politicians lined up behind Balaguer antihaitianism in a wave of nationalist and launched vicious attacks against Aristide. A good example were the comments of James Majluta, a merchant thrived Arab origin and a candidate for president, "Jean-Bertrand did not attack the President Joaquin Balaguer, he went to international forums to strike hard against the Dominican Republic ... the day of the inauguration of his rise to power he took with him a sorcerer and walked the streets of Port au Prince, shaming the Archbishop of that nation, and committed acts of anti-democratic ... he (Aristide) accused us (to the Dominican Republic) to the OAS, the International Labour Organization and United Nations Together, all the demons of the world "(Esteban Sarita, Listin Diario, 22 Feb., 1993, p. 4). Fabio Herrera Cabral, secretary of foreign affairs of the Balaguer administration, warned that "the Dominicans should be ready to counter any intrusion Aristedes ideas that seeks to impose on the Dominican Republic" (Carmen Carvajal, 1993, 16). Aristide's speech denouncing a well-known situation that occurred years ago (the slave labor of Haitians in Dominican Republic / NDV) was considered by the Dominican public opinion makers as a provocation of the Dominican people.
to Aristide's accusations, said Balaguer with decree 233-91 in retaliation (see appendix). The decree ordered the immediate deportation of all illegal Haitians whose ages were between 16 and 60. In the space of three months were deported about 50,000 Haitians (Ferguson 1992, 89). The Dominican military and economic advantage obtained profited from this operation to confiscate the belongings of the deportees. The decree was clearly aimed at destabilizing the Aristide administration to send home thousands of people would join the masses of unemployed and underemployed. On September 30, 1991, President Aristide, who had been elected with the help of 67% of voters, was ousted by a military coup led by General Raoul Cedras. His fate was very similar to the overthrow of Bosch 28 years earlier. Both (Aristide and Bosch / NDV) were elected charismatic leaders with popular support of the majority classes.
Both advocated by deep social and economic changes, pitting, and both immediately had to face the anger of the traditional elites. Both used external shocks with its neighboring countries in order to gain popular support at the time that their administrations were being destabilized. Finally, both were driven from power by military conspiracies seven months after jurors and with the support of the upper classes of countries. Note that Balaguer administration did not condemn the coup against Aristide. Instead, days after the coup the Dominican press was saturated with opinion condemning Aristide, blaming its unstable nature and cause of its demolition (Jose Israel Cuello 1991). Other articles highlighted that Haiti was a highly unstable country, virtually ungovernable, and, therefore, doomed to be ruled by strong men. Additionally, although the Balaguer administration had publicly offered to help in resolving the impasse in Haiti, and had officially supported the OAS embargo against the Haitian military government, he took action to prevent or at least delay, the solution to the Haitian crisis. In 1993, Balaguer administration authorized the sale of foodstuffs and fuel "for humanitarian reasons" (Maximum 1993.1 M. Perez, 16). Then, when the embargo was more rigorous, in clear violation of sanctions imposed by the OAS, all kinds of articles, mainly gasoline, were taken to Haitian territory across the border in view of the Dominican military who benefited greatly from this smuggling (Howard W. French 1994b). In conclusion, the international embargo was so powerful was its articulation as weak, the Dominican Republic.
The total impact of the Haitian crisis coincided with the Dominican elections of May 1994. On the one hand, Aristide's return was now imminent, and, on the other, a black Haitian ancestry, Jose Francisco Pena Gomez, was the front in the electoral contest. Balaguer, again, playing his nationalist card. He stood in defense of the Dominican Republic against an international conspiracy to unite the two nations (French 1994a).
television commercials warning of the dangers of voting for Pena Gomez. Not surprisingly, opinion polls during the election campaign showed that 30% of Dominicans felt that the color and race of a candidate are important ("Merge ..." 1994, 34). While this campaign is inferred to hit his Haitian relations with the de facto regime in Haiti were normal. Finally, through fraud and manipulation, Balaguer won the election after a post-election crisis that lasted almost three months. Meanwhile, the U.S. embassy to apply additional pressure to ensure diaphanous Balaguer election results and full compliance with the embargo (against Haiti / ndv). Balaguer finally agreed to allow an international observer force to help the military to enforce the embargo. From here Clinton administration immediately recognized the victory of Balaguer and even the new U.S. ambassador attended the opening ceremony.
CONCLUSION:
Haitian policies have been fundamentally influenced by two external actors: the United States and the Dominican Republic. While the U.S. is a superpower that has invaded Haiti twice in the twentieth century, the influence of the Dominican Republic should not be underestimated. The Dominican Republic shares with Haiti the island of Hispaniola (which is itself a rarity), and, additionally, had a longer relationship with Haiti dating from colonial times. The recent Aristide experience demonstrates the influence of the Dominican Republic on Haitian politics. First, the decree of deportation issued by the Balaguer administration worsened an already bad economic situation in Haiti, as well as being a resource embarrassing for the administration gives Aristide. Second, the visible position of Balaguer anti Aristide was a favorable factor to his overthrow. Even the overthrow was clearly work of internal political problems, the vision of Balaguer strengthened the position of the Haitian military. Third, the strong position of Balaguer in compliance with the international embargo ostensibly helped Haitian military leaders to get extra time, and thus delay the return of Aristide. Finally, when the U.S. military left Haiti, Balaguer actions would be essential for the stabilization of the new Haitian administration. The reasons behind these actions are to be found in a constant de Balaguer, whose appeal is his own conception as to the reason of state, in part based on their views anti-Haitian. According to this dominant ideology, Haiti is incapable of governing democratically. Only strong men can govern it. Worse, Haiti's democratic attempts to create political instability could affect the Dominican Republic by thousands of refugees who try to escape political violence. In addition, an authoritarian government would promote a more predictable and stable climate for doing business.
Finally, authoritarian governments in Haiti have proven to be better partners in the lucrative smuggling across the border and trafficking of Haitian workers for the Dominican sugar industry. Consequently, while the ruling Dominican flags flying to convene anti-Haitian nationalist support, maintain, at a time, close relations with the dominant groups in Haiti. And, as the old maxim, "divide and conquer", the Dominican and Haitian people have been taught to be regarded as enemies, while their leaders benefit from this division.
REFERENCES:
- Baud, Michiel. 1993 ª. "A border crossing: rural society through the Dominican-Haitian (1870-1930)." Social Studies 26 (94): 5-28.
- Baud, Michiel. 1993b. "A boundary-Haven: Dominicans and Haitians against the State (1870-1930)." Social Studies 26 (92): 39-64.
- Carvajal, Carmen. 1993. "Vice Chancellor Herrera Cabral RD-integration rule Haiti." Listin Diario, 25 January, 16.
- Cassa, Roberto. 1975. "The Ideology of Racism in the Dominican ruling class." Science 3 (1): 59-85.
- Cornielle, Carlos. 1980. "Dominico-Haitian Historical Process: A Warning to Dominican youth." Santo Domingo .- American Publications Crassweller, Robert D. 1966. "Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator." New York: Macmillan.
- Cuello, José Israel. 1991. "" Oh, Titid!, - Not James. " El Siglo, October 9, 7
- Diederich, Bernard, and Al Burt. 1986. Papa Doc and the Tontons Macoutes: The Truth about Haiti. " Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana.
- Ferguson, James. 1992. "The Dominican Republic: Beyond the Ligthhouse." London: Latin America Boreau.
- French, Howard W. 1994a. "A Dominican · s 2 Burdens: Haiti and Balaguer." The New York Times, 14 April 1994.
- French, Howard W. 1994b. "Oil Embargo Boom Creates · · Near Haitian Border." The New York Times, 13 March .- "Fusion campaign issue." 1994. Rumbo 1 (16): 34 .- Moya Pons, Frank. 1997. Colonial History of Santo Domingo. 3rd. Ed Santiago: Universidad Catolica Madre y Maestra.
- Peña Batlle, Manuel A. 1946. "History of the Dominico-Haitian border issues. Ciudad Trujillo (Santo Domingo): Luis Sanchez Andujar Publishing House.
- Perez, Maximo M. 1993 "The government authorizes the sale of food, fuel Haiti." Listin Diario, 12 April, 1, 16.
- Price-Mars, Jean. 1953. "The Republic of Haiti and the Dominican Republic." 3 vols. Port-au-Prince: Third Collection Fiftieth Anniversary of the Independence of Haiti.
- Sagas, Ernesto. 1993. "A Case of Mistaken Identity: antihaitianism in the Dominican Republic." Latinoamericanist 29 (1): 1-5 .- Sarita, Stephen. 1993. "Majluta considered provocative discord with RD Aristide." Listin Diario, 22 February, 4.
- Vega, Bernardo. 1988. "Trujillo and Haiti." Volume I (1930-1937). Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana.
APPENDIX: 233-91
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE WHEREAS
that as a result of the provisions contained in Decrees Nos. 417-90 and 188-91 dated October 15, 1990 and May 14, 1991, respectively, have been producing significant improvements in working conditions of workers cane, both domestic and foreign
WHEREAS the Government has promoted the adoption of a series of measures to humanize the work in the sugar refineries, especially those owned by the State Sugar Council (CEA).
In exercise of the powers conferred upon me by Article 55 of the Constitution, decree: Article 1
: Provides for the return of all children under the age of sixteen (16) years, foreign nationals, who were working as laborers in the planting, cultivation, cutting and hauling of sugarcane.
Article 2: The repatriation will take place at the expense of the state, exempt the returnees the major considerations.
Article 3: There is also the repatriation of all foreign workers, more than sixty (60) years of age, of the villages, both state-owned and those owned by private companies. These workers will be given all fringe benefits which they are entitled, according to Dominican law, benefits will be the responsibility of the respective private or the State in which they work these workers.
Article 4: The Ministry of Labor is responsible for ensuring strict compliance with this Decree., For which receive the largest contest of the Secretaries of State for the Armed Forces and Foreign Affairs, the head of the National Police and the Directorate General of Immigration. Joaquin Balaguer
June 13, 1991
* ----- Original title: An Apparent Contradiction? Popular Perceptions of Haiti and the Foreign Policy of the Dominican Republic. By Dr. Ernesto Sagas. English Translation: Frank Beras, (2000).
Subsequent revision of the translated text: PS Rodríguez R. -VEINS-2005.Tomado From http://haitiforever.com/windowsonhaiti/esagas2.shtml ORIGINAL VERSION EN ESPANOL -----
Sagas
Questions answered Who Ernesto Sagas?
Indeed, the trial of Mr. sagas that is inserted in this edition is one of a large number of documents circulating widely on the Haitian-Dominican issue obviously biased against the Dominican.
not question the right of Haitians and prohaitianos. Instead, we echo a complaint further. But we offer Dominican intellectuals pages of this magazine because it is obvious that the paths the Internet and many information tools are saturated respuesta.Parecería opinions without the work of Ernesto Sagas is out of time for clarification today, because it complies with the analysis of relations between the governments of Joaquín Balaguer, Jean Bertrand Aristide . But value judgments on the Dominican-Haitian historical conditions are in place in an essay in English, can be replicated across multiple media. This justifies its translation into English for this edition of streaks. The Sagas
view motivates a number of questions that we turn to several historians and intellectuals Dominican in order that they can agree and disagree.
All this means that many unanswered accusations "navigate" in the seas of globalization will be collected. And try to be answered. CM-Vetas
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